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LEGISLATION
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF NON-VOTING STOCK
During recent years, non-voting corporate stock has become
a familiar instrument of corporation finance, used to induce the
general public to invest without obtaining any of the rights or
responsibilities of corporate administration, and thereby enabling
those interested in the management of the corporation to retain
control, through voting stock.' The validity of such stock has
been recognized at common law,' and the statutes of many states,
including West Virginia, expressly authorize its issuance. The
West Virginia statute reads in part as follows:
"Every corporation, other than a banking institution,
shall have power to issue one or more classes of stock or one
or more series of stock within any class thereof, any or all of
which classes may be of stock with par value or stock without
par value, with such voting powers, full or limited, or without
voting powers and in such series and with such designations,
preferences and relative, participating optional or other
special rights, and qualifications, limitations or restrictions
thereof, as shall be stated and expressed in the charter, or in
any amendment thereto, or in the resolution or resolutions
providing for the issue of such stock adopted by the board of
directors .... "'
The first statutory provision for the issuance of non-voting
stock by West Virginia corporations was made in 1901.' That
provision, providing for non-voting preferred stock only, remained
on the books in the form in which adopted until the code revision
of 1931.' At that time the Code Commission, recommending the
retention of the old provision, expressed the view that non-voting
stock is constitutional.'
I The general subject of non-voting stock is well treated in DEWING, THE
FINANcIAL PoLIcY or CORPORATIONS (1926) 74-77; BERLE, STUDIES IN THE
LAw OF CORPORATION FINANCE (1928) 41 et seg.; BISHOP, FINANCING 01
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES (1929) 138 et seg. The use of such stock has in-
cited some criticism. BEARLE, op. cit., 142 et seq.
2 Be The Barrow Haematite Steel Co., Ltd., (1888) L. R. 39 Ch. Div. 582,
59 L. T. N. S. 500.
2 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 31, art. 1, § 22; W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie,
1932) § 3034.
'W. Va. Acts, 1901, c. 35, § 5. Of. W. VA. CODE ANN. (Warth, 1900)
c. 53, § 16.
"W. VA. CODE ANN. (Barnes, 1923) e. 53, § 16.
6 REPORT 0 CODE REVIsOEs OF W. VA., vol. 2, p. 10: ". . . . The weight
of modern judicial opinion seems to hold such a provision unconstitutional,
but these decisions, while well reasoned in many respects, seem to ignore the
flexibility of a state constitution to meet changing public conditions, and
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The legislature substituted for the old provision the much
broader above quoted provision, taken verbatim from the corpora-
tion laws of Delaware.' Although the legislative note appended
to this substituted section ignores any question of constitutional-
ity, the history of non-voting stock in Illinois and Delaware indi-
cates that the question discussed by the Code Commission might
easily arise in West Virginia.
In the absence of contrary constitutional provisions, there
seems to be no valid-legal objection to depriving stockholders of
the right to vote.8 In Illinois and Delaware, however, non-voting
stock has been held to be invalid under state constitutional pro-
visions in one instance identical, and in the other similar, to sec-
tion four of article eleven of the West Virginia Constitution,
which provides as follows:
"The Legislature shall provide by law that in all elec-
tions for directors or managers-of incorporated companies,
every stockholder (italics mine) shall have the right to vote,
in person or by proxy, for the number of shares of stock owned
for this reason do not give as much weight as we think should be given the
real purpose of the provision, which was to secure the right of cumulative
voting. It is thought that if its true weight is given the purpose in mind,
and the flexibility of state constitutions to meet changing conditions is not
forgotten, that the provision respecting preferred stock is constitutional,
especially where there has been a long existing legislative policy in harmony
with this statute, which has induced many corporations to adopt its provi-
sion. Attention is also called to the fact that the constitutional provision
referred to relates only to voting for directors, and does not relate to the
right to vote on other corporate acts."
7W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 31, art. 1, § 22, legislative note; W. VA. CODE
ANN. (Michie, 1932) § 3034, legislative note. Cf. Del. Laws 1929, p. 371,§ 5.
"Note (1922) 21 A. L. B. 643. Courts usually reach this result on the
ground that non-voting provisions are agreements between classes of stock-
holders, binding as such between the shareholders, and of no concern to the
public. Hamlin v. Toledo, etc., R. Co., 78 Fed. 664, 671, 36 L. R. A. 826(C. C. A. 6th, 1897); People v. Koenig, 113 App. Div. 756, 118 N. Y. Supp.
136 (1909); Miller v. Ratterman, 47 Ohio St., 141, 157, 24 N. E. 496 (1890).
But should such agreements be binding on a third party, as, for example, a
secretary of state requested to issue non-voting stocki
In the light of the broad provision of the present West Virginia statute, it
is noteworthy that, apparently, all cases dealing with the validity of non-
voting stock involve only preferred stock, and that the provisions are usually
spoken of as agreements between preferred and common stockholders. See
Note (1922) 21 A. L. R. 643, and cases cited supra. There would be no
difficulty, however, in construing them as agreements between a voting class
and a non-voting class. Cf.: Macintosh v. Flint, etc., R. Co., 34 Fed. 582(C. C. E. D. Mich. 1888); Gen. Inv. Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 87 N. J.
Eq. 234, 100 Atl. 347 (1917).
Some courts have intimated that non-voting provisions are of doubtful
public policy. Hamlin v. Toledo R. Co., supra. Others have expressly taken
the opposite stand. St. Regis Candies Co. v. Hovas, 117 Tex. 313, 3 S. W.
(2d) 429 (1928).
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 4 [1933], Art. 7
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol39/iss4/7
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
by him, for as many persons as there are directors or man-
agers to be elected, or to cumulate said shares, and give one
candidate as many votes as the number of directors multi-
plied by the number of his shares of stock, shall equal, or to
distribute them on the same principle among as many candi-
dates as he shall think fit; and such directors or managers
shall not be elected in any other manner."
The fate of non-voting stock in Illinois is of peculiar interest
in West Virginia, due to the fact that the constitutional provi-
sion! there in force is identical, in phraseology, to the West Vir-
ginia provision. In People v. Emmerson,° decided in 1922, the
Illinois Court held that that provision conferred upon all stock-
holders the right of one vote for each share of stock owned, and
that there could be no deprivation of that voting right. The
court placed its decision upon the "ordinary and natural mean-
ing" of the language used in the provision, holding that the pro-
vision's "unambiguous" wording prevented a consideration of
extrinsic matters, such as the constitutional debates, to discover
the purpose for which it was drafted. It is noteworthy that Ill-
inois has no statute authorizing non-voting stock, such as is found
in the West Virginia Code, and that legislative construction of a
constitution has considerable weight as to constitutional ques-
tions The Delaware Supreme Court, however, refused to allow
the presence of such a statute to deprive a constitutional provi-
sion of its fullest effect."
Delaware's -first provision for non-voting stock, enacted in
1899, '' was evidently copied after the corporation laws of New
Jersey," in which state there was no constitutional provision af-
fecting the validity of such a statute. At the time of the adoption
of the Delaware statute, however, the Delaware constitution pro-
vided,
"In all elections for directors and managers of statutory
corporations, each shareholder shall be entitled to one vote
for each share of stock he may hold.'
DIll. Const. 1870, art. 11, § 3.
8502 Ill. 300, 134 N. E. 707, 21 A. L. R. 636 (1922).
State v. Harden, 62 W. Va. 313, 58 S. E. 715 (1907). See State v.
Rocke, 91 W. Va. 423, 113 S. E. 647 (1922).
Brooks v. State, 3 Boyce 1, 79 Atl. 790 (Del. 1911).
"Del. Laws 1899, c. 273.
"
4Brooks v. State, supra n. 12.
" Del. Const. 1897, art. 9, § 6.
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In Brooks v. State," decided in 1911, the Delaware Supreme
Court, in construing this constitutional provision, held the statute
depriving stockholders of their right to vote unconstitutional and
all issues of non-voting stock thereunder invalid. In 1903, how-
ever, prior to this decision Delaware had repealed the constitu-
tional provision in question," the effect of the Brooks case apply-
ing only to non-voting stock issued prior to the repeal. Thus the
way was cleared, in Delaware, for the unquestioned validity of
non-voting corporate stock. The broad provision subsequently
adopted by the West Virginia Legislature was first put on the
Delaware statute books in 1929.8
In State v. Swanger,' decided in 1905, the Missouri Supreme
Court held that the purpose of a provision of the Missouri Con-
stitution similar to the West Virginia provision was only to
guarantee to those shareholders having the right to vote the right
of cumulative voting, and that non-voting provisions were agree-
ments between the two classes of stockholders, of no concern to
the public, and not affected by the constitutional provision. Al-
though the Swanger case has been distinguished by the Illinois
Court,. as involving a constitutional provision different in word-
ing and meaning from the Illinois provision, which, as has been
pointed out, is identical to that of West Virginia, the Missouri
result appears to be clearly contrary to those reached in Illinois
and Delaware.
The history of non-voting stock would seem to indicate what
must have been the intended purpose of the Delaware and Illinois
constitutional provisions. At common law each shareholder had
but one vote, despite the number of shares he might hold,' a vot-
ing method which was obviously unfair. This method eventually
gave way, in most jurisdictions, at least, to the so-called, modern
11GSupra n. 12. This case reverses State v. Brooks, 74 At. 37 (Del. Sup'r.
Ct. 1909), a case frequently cited for the proposition that the benefit of the
constitutional provision could be waived by the stockholders.
17Del. Laws 1903, c. 1, pp. 3, 4, and c. 254, p. 543; Notes to Const., DEL.
REV. CODE (1915) p. lxxvi.
IDel. Laws 1929, p. 371, § 5.19190 Mo. 561, 89 S. W. 872, 4 Ann. Cas. 563 (1905).
*Mo. Const., 1875, art. 12, § 6: "In all elections for directors or managers
of any incorporated company, each shareholder shall have the right to cast
as many votes in the aggregate as shall equal the number of shares so held
by him in said company, multiplied by the number of directors or managers
to be elected at such election; and each shareholder may cast the whole num-
ber of votes, either in person or by proxy, for one candidate .. .
u The People v. Emmerson, supra n. 10.
2 BisHop, op. ti. supra n. 1, at 139; Taylor v. Griswold, 2 Green 22 (N.
J. L. 1834).
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"statutory" method, under which each shareholder has the right
to cast one vote for each share of stock he holds The Delaware
constitutional provision could reasonably be interpreted as being
merely a guarantee of the "statutory" method of voting to share-
holders having the right to vote. Likewise, the Illinois provision,
adopted early in the development of cumulative voting, which
followed the adoption of the "statutory" method could be inter-
preted as intended merely to secure to minority stockholders hav-
ing the right to vote a representation in the management of the
corporation."
Section four of article eleven of the West Virginia Constitu-
tion was adopted as a part of the Constitution of 1872. Its word-
ing warrants the opinion that it was taken from the Illinois Con-
stitution, adopted but two years before. Available records of the
constitutional convention indicate that it passed through the com-
mittee of the whole and was adopted by the convention, without
recorded consideration, in the form in which submitted by the
committee on corporations,' so that its real purpose seems to be
nowhere set out.
Should the constitutionality of non-voting stock arise in West
Virginia, the Missouri case would seem to be good precedent for
construing section four of article eleven of the constitution as
being merely a guarantee of cumulative voting,' for the benefit of
those stockholders entitled to vote,' especially in the light of the
legislative and executive interpretation which has been placed on
the provision.
-JACK C. BURDETT.
BIsHoP, op. cit. supra n. 1, at 139-140.
Cf. (1922) 17 ILL. L. Rsv. 138.
The records of the constitutional convention indicate no consideration of
section four although other sections of article eleven received considerable
attention. See JOURNAL or THE CoNsTIT TIoNAL CONVENTiON, 243-255.
0 The West Virginia court has apparently considered it but once, at that
time holding that it gives railroad corporation shareholders the right to
cumulate their vote in the election of directors. Cross v. W. Va. Ry. Co., 35
W. Va. 174, 12 S. E. 1071 (1891).
27The "statutory" method, one vote for each share, had previously been
a concern of the West Virginia Code. W. VA. CODE (1870) c. 53, § 44.
28 The section of the West Virginia Code providing for cum:lative voting
provides that shareholders shall have one vote for each share entitled to vote.
W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 31, art. 1, § 66; W. VA. CODE ANN. (Miehie,
1932) § 3078.
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